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Platform organizations such as Uber, eBay and Airbnb represent a growing disruptive phenomenon in
contemporary capitalism, transforming economic organization, the nature of work, and the distribution
of wealth. This paper investigates the accounting practices that underpin this new form of organizing,
and in doing so confronts a signiﬁcant challenge within the accounting literature: the need to escape
what Hopwood (1996) describes as its “hierarchical consciousness”. In order to do so, this paper develops
the concept of evaluative infrastructure which describes accounting practices that enable platform based
organization. They are evaluative because they deploy a plethora of interacting devices, including
rankings, ratings, reviews, and audits to establish orders of worth. They are infrastructures because they
provide the invisible yet essential mechanisms for the ﬂow of economic activity and exchange on
platforms. Illustrating the concept of evaluative infrastructure with the example of eBay, the paper's
contribution is to (1) provide an analytical vocabulary to capture the accounting practices underpinning
platforms as new organizational forms, and in so doing (2) extend accounting scholars' analytical focus
from hierarchical settings towards heterarchies. Conceptually, this shift from management accounting to
evaluative infrastructures entails a focus on relationality (evaluative infrastructures do not represent or
reference but relate things, people and ideas with each other); generativity (evaluative infrastructures do
not territorialize objects but disclose new worlds); and new forms of control (evaluative infrastructures
are not centres of calculation; rather, control is radically distributed, whilst power remains centralized).
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.“I look at the scaffold for the king from the carpenter's
perspective: The structure of the scaffold is of more interest
than the actual execution.”
Jean Cocteau1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by a growing and disruptive economic
phenomenon: the rise of platforms as new organizational form.
Platform organizations include accommodation providers such as
Airbnb, ride-sharing companies such as Uber, service and product
marketplaces such as Taskrabbit or eBay, and even relationshipnberger).
t the University of Edinburgh
of Economics and Business,services such as eHarmony; indeed, There's an Uber for Everything
Now as the Wall Street Journal commented in 2015.2 Traveling
under many names including platform capitalism (Srnicek, 2016),
sharing economy (Sundararajan, 2016), collaborative consumption
(Botsman & Rogers, 2010), gig economy (Mulcahy, 2016), mesh
(Gansky, 2010), multi-sided markets (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016)
or commons-based peer production (Benkler, 2011), the phenom-
enon of platforms can be deﬁned by distributed and often switch-
role producers (sellers) and consumers (buyers) interacting with
each other, digitally mediated by a third party, the platform owner.
Platforms organize distributed production (Benkler, 2002) and
collaborative consumption (Botsman & Rogers, 2010) without
direct control over the value creation process. Rather, platform
organizations' value-add is to provide an interface for interaction
and controlling mechanism for transactions between tens of
thousands, sometimes even millions of buyers and sellers who
might never meet in person. Platform owners' business models rest
on their ability to ensure trust between these buyers and sellers.2 http://www.wsj.com/articles/theres-an-uber-for-everything-now-1430845789.
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behaviours, platforms turn what could easily become “markets for
lemons” (Akerlof, 1970) into thriving exchanges. What allows them
to do so is a speciﬁc accounting regime e a regime that this paper
sets out to describe as evaluative infrastructure.
Taken the economic signiﬁcance of platform organizations, this
seems a timely task. Digital technology and themove towards access
rather than ownership (Rifkin, 2001), among other factors, are fuel-
ling the rapid growth of platforms. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014;
2016) estimates the transaction value facilitated by collaborative
economy platforms in Europe to be V28 billion, tripling since 2013,
and the global revenue to be $335 billion by 2025. Platform organi-
zations have an extraordinary scale: as of 2014 eBay had 165 million
active users,3 Uber was hosting over 1 million rides per day,4 and
Airbnb was facilitating 155 million guest stays annually, surpassing
the HiltonWorldwide by 22 percent (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014,
p.14). The valuationsof these relatively youngorganizations (manyof
them “unicorns”) further indicate the economic signiﬁcance of the
phenomenon. Eight years after its founding and with less than 8000
employees the ride-sharing platform Uber is valued at close to $70
billion d more than General Motors, which employs over 200,000
people and manufactures annually close to 10 million cars. 5 Eight
years after its founding and with only 1600 employees, Airbnb simi-
larly is valued at $30 billiondmore than Hilton Worldwide.6 These
optimistic valuations are met with critical scrutiny of various re-
searchers, who argue that the “Uberiﬁcation” of the economy is
resulting in a deterioration of labour standards amounting to the
marketization and ﬁnancialization of everyday life (Davis, 2016;
Scholz, 2016). The contested political economy of platform capital-
ism (Martin, 2016) highlights the importanceof better understanding
its inner workings, which are enabled in large measure by its novel
accounting regime. Toward this end we ask: What is the role of ac-
counting practices in platform organization and through which
mechanisms do they work? In other words, what is at stake is
whether and how accounting scholarship can contribute critically to
better our understanding of platforms as a disruptive organizational
form.
Turning from business to the bookshelf, two bodies of literature
in accounting prove helpful in articulating our research question.
On the one hand, the growing strand of literature attending to
supply chains and supply networks highlights the changing and
contested role of accounting concepts and practices in the forma-
tion and control of alliances, joint ventures, strategic partnerships,
outsourcing, and cooperative between independent units
(Håkansson & Lind, 2004; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Caglio &
Ditillo, 2008). On the other hand, studies of accounting as a po-
wer/knowledge apparatus (see Miller & Power, 2013 for an over-
view), and more recently explorations of non-traditional forms of
accounting such as rankings, ratings and other classiﬁcation re-
gimes (Kornberger & Carter, 2010; Jeacle & Carter, 2011; Pollock &
D'Adderio, 2012; Fourcade & Healy, 2013; Power, 2015) explore
processes of accounting which extend beyond organizational
boundaries.
These strands of literature offer a foundation for an investigation
of platform organization. However, as we elaborate below, much of
this literature remains beholden to what Hopwood (1996, p. 589)
criticised as the persistence of “accounting's hierarchical3 https://www.statista.com/topics/2181/ebay/.
4 http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/17/uber-says-its-doing-1-
million-rides-per-day-140-million-in-last-year/#19515df97a68.
5 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-valuation-breakingviews-
idUSKBN14B23A.
6 http://qz.com/719157/airbnb-is-raising-money-at-a-30-billion-valuation/.consciousness”. Extending their unit of analysis from ﬁrms to
supply chains and networks, the ﬁrst body of literature investigates
how ﬁrms, like “islands of conscious power in this ocean of un-
conscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of
buttermilk” (to paraphrase the economist Dennis Holme Robertson,
quoted in Coase, 1937, p. 386), coordinate action; but in so doing
this literature remains wedded to notions of hierarchy and the
visible hand searching for efﬁciencies in closed supply chains.
Whilst thinking accounting as an apparatus of governmentality, the
second, more critical, strand of literature remains tied to a centralist
notion of power e the buttermilk is studied to understand the
formation of lumps of butter, to stretch the metaphor. Both litera-
ture represent points of departure for our own contribution.
The contribution of this paper is to propose and specify evalu-
ative infrastructure as an analytical concept with which to attend to
the accounting practices that help to structure platform organiza-
tion and in doing so extend accounting beyond its hierarchical
consciousness. The concept of evaluative infrastructure includes a
focus on relationality, generativity and on an evolving apparatus of
control that we describe as protocol. With the concept of rela-
tionality we propose that evaluate infrastructures do not represent
or reference pre-existing objects, but relate and recombine people,
ideas, and things so as to construct new economic subjects and
objects. With the concept of generativity, we propose that evalua-
tive infrastructures do not territorialize from a centre, but instead
disclose new worlds. And with the concept of protocol we propose
that control in evaluative infrastructures is radically distributed
whilst power remains centralized alluding to the interplay between
hierarchical and heterachical power relations.
These three concepts provide part and parcel of a vocabulary
with which to describe production in, and control of, platform or-
ganization. Put metaphorically: if we look at Manhattan today we
marvel at the skyscrapers from the early 20th century; yet in order
to understand their designs we have to study the race between
several intertwined infrastructures, most notably plumbing, lift
technology and ﬁnance (Koolhaas, 1978). This paper makes a ho-
mologous argument: in order to understand platform organization
(and by extension other, non-hierarchical, forms of economic ac-
tivity) we need to look at the invisible infrastructures that coordi-
nate and control platform activities. It is this paper's contention
that the focus on these evaluative infrastructures helps to equip
accounting scholars with critical instruments to study a set of
emerging phenomena that are related to platforms as new orga-
nizational form, including distributed innovation, crowd sourcing,
big data and other burgeoning phenomena.
This paper is structured as follows: in the next sectionwe review
the literature that marks the point of departure for our argument.
We then develop the concept of evaluative infrastructures. This
conceptual work implies mobilizing a variety of different literature
that have discussed infrastructures in depth. In order to illustrate
the mechanisms and effects of evaluative infrastructures we pro-
vide the extended example of eBay as prototypical platform orga-
nization that is based, at least in large part, on such a novel
accounting regime. This calls for a caveat: eBay and related exam-
ples are not intended to provide closure but, to paraphrase Thomas
Schelling (1978), to spark curiosity for further investigation. The
paper concludes with a discussion of implications for research and
reﬂections for practice.
2. Accounting beyond its hierarchical consciousness?
2.1. Empirical context: the disruptive phenomenon of platform
organization
Our paper uses the phenomenon of platform organization as a
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platforms that organize economic activity of third parties without
directly controlling them will facilitate the development of the
concept of evaluative infrastructure. While management account-
ing systems typically control production inside hierarchies, plat-
forms require evaluative infrastructures as accounting systems to
organize the economic activity they host. How canwe describe this
new organizational phenomenon, and how does it differ from
networks, markets and hierarchies? The following observation
might be a good place to start looking for an answer:
The world's largest taxi ﬁrm, Uber, owns no cars. The world's
most popular media company, Facebook, creates no content. The
world's most valuable retailer, Alibaba, carries no stock. And the
world's largest accommodation provider, Airbnb, owns no
property. Something interesting is happening.7
That “something” refers to a disruptive organizational phe-
nomenon e platform organization.8 Mediated by digital interfaces,
platform organizations are deﬁned as “matchmakers” between
producers who offer excess capacity and other assets for consumers
to use, buy or simply enjoy (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016). Platform
organizations are a “new type of ﬁrm”, which provide “the [digital]
infrastructure to intermediate between different groups” (Srnicek,
2016, p. 12). Their strategic position between different user
groupsmakes them the “ground uponwhich their [users'] activities
occur, thereby giving it privileged access to record them” (Srnicek,
2016, p. 12). There are at least two main reasons for the rise of this
new organizational phenomenon. These include, ﬁrst, the emer-
gence of knowledge, creativity, and human ingenuity as the key
resource in economic production over the past decades (Benkler,
2002). Know-how as resource is distributed across many actors,
sticky and tacit (von Hippel, 1978). Hence, echoing Hayek (1945),
models of distributed innovation such as open source have become
increasingly popular as they harness “the wisdom of the crowd”
(Surowiecki, 2005). A second reason is technology: the Internet
reduces search and other transaction costs facilitating the effective
coordination of distributed economic activity (D'Adderio & Pollock,
2014). Platforms are the organizational form that incorporate these
two fundamental changes into their structures and channel their
powers through their speciﬁc designs (Kornberger, 2016).
Platform organizations are distinct from hierarchies, markets
and networks and challenge their status as opposing and exclusive
forms of organization (Powell, 1990). Their owners hold limited
ﬁxed assets, hire only few employees, and externalize the value
creation process; hence platform organizations question not only
extant organizational designs but also, quite fundamentally, the
idea of the ﬁrm (Coase, 1937), assumptions of the resource-based
perspective (Pernrose, 1959), and our understanding of value cre-
ation processes (Porter, 1985). Platform organizations also chal-
lenge network designs. According to Powell (1990) networks
consist of a ﬁnite number of organizations that form an alliance in
pursuit of mutually beneﬁcial goals. Examples include learning
networks in the bio-tech industry where a network is deﬁned as set
of inter-organizational relationships (see Powell, Koput, & Smith-
Doerr, 1996) as well as modular production networks arranged7 Tom Goodwin, senior vice president of strategy and innovation at Havas Media,
quoted in Hamish McRae, The Independent, Tuesday May 5 2015.
8 A note on terminology: we use to term platforms to refer to the digital interfaces
that organize platform production. We specify the platform owners as the ﬁrms that
legally own the interfaces, and we use to term platform organizations to refer to the
units or organizational forms within which production occurs, often speciﬁed by
the name of the platform owners, as well as (in the singular form) the phenomenon
and effects of this mode of production.around common design rules (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996;
D'Adderio & Pollock, 2014). In contrast with such networks, plat-
form organizations are more market-based as they invite literally
millions of hitherto unknown producers and consumers to transact
with each other; the difference is quantitative but also qualitative:
they do not extend or enlarge a set of relations, but populate a place
with the possibilities for relations to form. At the same time, plat-
form organizations also retain hierarchical features as they control
the proprietary evaluative infrastructuremaking the organizational
form possible.
Different disciplines have studied platform organizations
including product development, technology strategy and industrial
economics (Baldwin & Woodard, 2008). Early scholarship focused
on the relationship between innovation and platforms (Kim &
Kogut, 1996) and especially digital innovation (Yoo, Boland,
Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 2012). Work on platform leadership
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) and governance inquired into trade-
offs between adoption and appropriability (West, 2003) and be-
tween diversity and control (Boudreau, 2012). Platform economics
investigated the dynamics of platform evolution, with a focus on
network effects and other (positive) externalities (Lerner & Tirole,
2002). From an organizational design perspective, platforms were
characterized by a common set of design rules. As Baldwin and
Woodard (2008: 3) argue:
the fundamental architecture behind all platforms is essentially
the same: namely, the system is partitioned into a set of “core”
components with low variety and a complementary set of “pe-
ripheral” components with high variety (Tushman &Murmann,
1998). The low-variety components constitute the platform.
They are the long-lived elements of the system and thus
implicitly or explicitly establish the system's interfaces, the rules
governing interactions among the different parts.
Here the platform represents a stable interface for organizing
communication, collaboration and control for distributed produc-
tion (Kornberger, 2016). Accounting devices constitute the low-
variety ‘core’ components of the platform. Indeed, platform in-
terfaces consist of an ecology of accounting devices in the form of
rankings, lists, classiﬁcations, stars and other symbols (‘likes, ‘links’,
tags, and other traces left through clicks) which relate buyers,
sellers, and objects. These devices provide the “format and furni-
ture” (Pollock & D'Adderio, 2012) for judgment, search and selec-
tion to be undertaken, and for matching, interaction, and relations
among diverse users to be achieved in distinctive and consequen-
tial ways (Fourcade & Healy, 2013). More generally, accounting
devices provide much of the “trust infrastructures” (Sundararajan,
2016, p. 60) necessary to prevent platforms from degenerating
intomarkets for lemons (Akerlof, 1970), in particular when it comes
to “high-stakes transactions” (Sundararajan, 2016, p. 98) such as
renting fully furnished private apartments on AirBnB, which may
test their limits.
Therein lies the puzzle that sparked our curiosity and motivated
us to look into the accounting regime underpinning platforms:
since value creation is externalized and occurs on the platform
without the platform owner being able to control it hierarchically,
we need to think of accounting practices as horizontally distributed
as well. It is important to note that this proposition which we will
explore in this paper does not suggest heterarchical accounting
regimes would replace more traditional hierarchical forms of ac-
counting. Indeed, internally platform organizations may resemble
hierarchically organized ﬁrms. Airbnb for instance employs around
1600 staff and uses presumably more or less traditional accounting
practices to control and direct their behaviour. However, the focus
of this paper is on how Airbnb (to stay with the example) organizes
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provided by users Airbnb has virtually no control over. Because
value creation itself is accomplished by hundreds of thousands of
people outside hierarchical relationships we need to investigate the
speciﬁcity of the accounting regime that underpins such decen-
tralized production. As ﬁrst attempt to solve our puzzle we turned
towards the accounting literature that have challenged, if not
overcome, accounting's hierarchal consciousness.
2.2. Theoretical context: accounting for platforms
Much of the “hierarchical consciousness” which Hopwood and
others lament had and continues to have much to do with the
“prevalent patterns of organizational change” (Hopwood, 1996, p.
589)e namely the development and proliferation of the traditional
ﬁrm. Management accounting, consequently, has been centrally
concerned with coordination and control within, and from the
perspective of, the hierarchical ﬁrm. As Håkansson and Lind (2004,
p. 52) noted aptly “accounting and the classical market-hierarchy
dichotomy are well adjusted to each other”.
However, over the past decades two speciﬁc strands of ac-
counting literature have challenged this hierarchical orientation
and explored accounting in non-hierarchical settings. On the one
hand, a number of empirically driven studies have analysed lateral
accounting regimes of and in buyer-supplier relations, extended
supply chains and network organizations (Håkansson& Lind, 2004;
Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). On the other hand, a variety of critical
investigations have been undertaken into accounting as apparatus
and regime of governmentality, extending within but also between
and beyond the organization as such (Burchell, Clubb, & Hopwood,
1985; Miller & Power, 2013). We will now turn to these two liter-
ature as they provide the conceptual points of departure for our
investigation.
2.3. Point of departure # 1: accounting in inter-organizational
networks
An important strand of accounting literature attending to supply
chains and supply networks has highlighted tensions in the re-
lationships between coordination, operation and appropriation in
alliances, joint ventures, strategic partnerships, outsourcing, and
cooperation between independent units (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008;
Dekker, 2004, 2008; Håkansson & Lind, 2004; Lind & Thrane,
2010). As argued by Håkansson and Lind (2004: 52), the chal-
lenges which accounting confronts as strong distinctions between
hierarchies and markets are complicated by network conﬁgura-
tions of various kinds:
Relationship coordination may cause a problem from an ac-
counting point of view as contemporary accounting depends on
deﬁned, limited entities. This new form of coordination blurs
the clearly deﬁned boundaries which accounting presupposes
and requires.
The effect of the blurring of boundaries resides in the problem
that such ﬁrms share production function but not objective func-
tion since they are autonomous ﬁrms that rely in their activities on
complements added by others (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006).
Therefore, supply chain and network accounting are lateral in
principle, but often, as research shows, in practice such accounting
is concerned with the formation of relative hierarchies between a
powerful and a less powerful (set of) ﬁrms (Frances & Garnsey,
1996; Kraus & Str€omsten, 2016; Seal, Berry, & Cullen, 2004), e.g.
through open book accounting (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Alenius,
Lind, & Str€omsten, 2015; Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005; Windolph &Moeller, 2012), or of the dynamic development of relations be-
tween the involved parties as they are mediated by accounting
(Chua & Mahama, 2007; Coad & Cullen, 2006; Mouritsen, Hansen,
& Hansen, 2001; Thrane & Hald, 2006).
This research raises the issue of whether it is possible to un-
derstand a supply chain or a network as a governed entity. Ac-
counting here tends to change random interactions into ﬁrm-like
relationships in an attempt at coordinating already known and
existing ﬁrms by accounting mechanisms that extend well beyond
the ﬁrm (Håkansson & Lind, 2004). The concern is to assign roles
and responsibilities that can be contracted or at least mediated by
accounting across the supply chain. Therefore, current accounting
research focuses on how (or not) accounting helps to create ‘meta-
organization’ resembling a hierarchy de-facto if not de-jure.
In this literature on networks and inter-ﬁrm relations, therefore,
production is distributed among ﬁrms in a perhaps ever-growing
supply chain but the focal ﬁrm still remains a key conceptual
parameter. In supply chains and networks, production is decen-
tralized but still attributable; the boundary of the ﬁrm is extended,
but only to include a ﬁnite number of other ﬁrms. Conceptually
therefore the ﬁrm still seeks, as in the classical hierarchical model,
to establish control and coordination among its various uni-
tsdthese units just exist down the supply chain and beyond the
legal limits of the organization (Håkansson & Lind, 2004; Van der
Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). Hence our ﬁrst point of depar-
ture: to capture radically distributed organizational forms such as
eBay, Uber or Airbnb we need to originate our conceptual thinking
from somewhere other than a focal ﬁrm which distributes and ar-
ranges production and relations that were originally performed in-
house.
2.4. Point of departure # 2: territorializing from the centre?
The second, perhaps more critical strand of literature in-
vestigates accounting in its social and institutional context
(Hopwood, 1983). This body of work that has explicitly sought to
capture the nature of accounting as an “ensemble” (Miller&Napier,
1993), “constellation” (Burchell et al., 1985), “complex” (Miller &
Power, 2013; Miller & Rose, 1990) or “assemblage” (Miller, 1998).
Such work, exempliﬁed in Miller and O'Leary's (1994) now classic
account of the transformation of American manufacturing, sees
accounting as a series of relations, relays, and linkages between
heterogeneous elements which unfold in a variety of different lo-
cations. Understood in this way, accounting “links up different ac-
tors with a common narrative and may constitute a network of
relations within and beyond the boundaries of the enterprise” (Miller
& Power, 2013, p. 581; emphasis added).
However, much of the vocabulary and theorization about space,
representation, and power that this literature employs in order to
conceptualize these assemblages, remains wedded to hierarchy.
The accounting complex that has been investigated and described
is one that is deeply programmatic and attentive to control (e.g.
Graham, 2010; Townley, 1995). As such, researchers have been
primarily concerned with the localization of power: the creation of
“obligatory passage points” or “centres of calculation” (Latour,
1986) that allow for “government at a distance” (Miller & Rose,
1990) and “long distance control” through accounting (Jones,
2010; Robson, 1992). The topography of space upon which ac-
counting has been shown to be assembled is one with a distinctive
centre and periphery, exempliﬁed in the notion of territorialization
which accounting complexes are often seen to be part and product.
As Miller and Power (2013: 579-80) explain: “Territorialization is
achieved by linking ideas of the market with instruments of ac-
counting so as to allow households, hospitals, schools, retired
persons, or whatever to be constituted as accounting subjects
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the domination or mastery of one space through the articulation of
control, in the face of resistance or anti-programmes, in another
(Mennicken & Miller, 2012). As such, accounting is envisioned to
have an implied centre from which power is projected and objects
are remade (Miller & Rose, 1990). For instance, in Power's analysis
of the Impact Case Study as new accountability infrastructure in the
UK higher education sector, he argues that “[t]he effect of infra-
structure development and centralization is to create a new nor-
mativity or performance capability at the centre of the
organization” (Power, 2015, p. 8). The “nascent apparatus or
infrastructure” (Power, 2015) that Power describes is characterized
by new roles, functions, processes and structures e all of which are
organizational phenomena inscribed in a hierarchical setting (see
also Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006).
This theorizing has been developed in the context of hierarchical
organization such as the factory or the ward. In this context ac-
counting very well might be a territorialization device but the
centre and periphery of this new form of organization are less clear.
Herein lies our second point of departure: under certain conditions,
accounting assemblages are no doubt central to processes of
territorialization and re-territorialization; but in others, such as
those which characterize decentralized production, it may well be
that the centre of calculation is more ambiguous, the programme
less deﬁned, and the aspiration to mastery less clear. Hence, in
order to theorize accounting beyond its hierarchical consciousness,
we need to discard of the notion of centre and periphery which has
been embedded in conceptions of territorialization. In platform
organization we suggest that the programmatic element of ac-
counting may not be as clear cut or predetermined as extant ac-
counting research assumes.
2.5. Point of departure # 3: making up people and things?
A hierarchical consciousness also seeps into conceptualizations
of the relations between the accounting apparatus and the people
and things which it seeks to represent. Understood as a means of
achieving (however momentarily or imperfectly) a kind of long
distance control, accounting is seen to reconstitute its objects
through its capacity to “translate” (Robson, 1992), “transpose”
(Knorr-Cetina & Grimpe, 2008), “reframe” (Miller & Power, 2013),
or “interess” (Chua, 1995). Miller and Power (2013) use Oakes
et al.’s (1998) analysis of a museum to show this process in which
accounting helps to “reframe” its activities and purpose from a
cultural institution into an economic entity “amenable to the nar-
ratives of markets and economic rationality” (Miller & Power, 2013,
p. 580).
Accounting, understood this way, is argued to remake its objects
through the ability to corner, capture, stabilize, or close: accounting
“envelops” its objects (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 562); it territorial-
izes by fencing in. This conception of accounting suggests a process
of inventionwhich leads from an aspiration to a reality, an ideal to a
norm, a programme to a technology, although intermediated by a
variety of compromises and reconﬁgurations. For instance, in the
already quoted paper on the Impact Case Study regime, Power
(2015) argued that new forms of evidence such as testimonies
from practitioners became important to demonstrate impact. These
testimonies and other forms of evidence were not “out there”
waiting to be collected “but would have to be actively created and
solicited” (Power, 2015, p. 5; emphasis in original). Here we see a
demand for evidence from the central administrators resulting in
the construction of evidence from below. Much accounting litera-
ture has evolved along this line of argumentation: a powerful and
aspiring centre has been shown to remake people and things in its
name (see Miller & Power, 2013, p. 561).Herein lies our third point of departure: no doubt accounting
does capture, reign in, envelop, frame and territorialize; but there is
a generative aspect to accounting that does not necessarily follow
this line of development. Accountingmight be engaged in disclosing
objects: akin to early rail infrastructure, accounting as infrastruc-
ture may be simultaneously a means of disclosing a new world, of
exploring, opening up, generating new opportunities and new
subjectivities, such as marking those living on “the wrong side of
the tracks”. Here we do not have trails, sequences, and accumula-
tions, but disjunctures, surprises, open spaces that emerge
endogenously from accounting processes (Revellino & Mouritsen,
2015; Quattrone & Hopper, 2001).
2.6. Point of departure # 4: accounting as mediating device?
A ﬁnal point of departure for our argument is the literature on
accounting as a mediating device (Miller & O'Leary, 2007; Millo &
MacKenzie, 2009; Poon, 2009; Pollock & D'Adderio, 2012; Power,
2015). This research has attended to a variety of accounting de-
vices, instruments, and other intermediaries that constitute link-
ages between ideas and practices, institutions and technologies.
Miller and Power (2013: 593) stress the inseparability of devices
and the wider accounting complex, arguing for the need to attend
to the “ways in which actors, aspirations and arenas can be con-
nected laterally or horizontally through accounting practices”.
Following this idea, several authors suggested placing organiza-
tions and organizational relations in the context of accounting
devices, rather than the other way around. Miller and O'Leary
(2007) for instance, describe the way that Moore's Law and asso-
ciated technology roadmaps came to envision relations between
and among organizations and between science and the economy in
such a way that the proposed future could be depended upon,
organizational decisions could be made, and a semiconductor in-
dustry could develop in a coordinated way. Similarly, Poon (2009)
highlights the way that the secondary market for subprime prod-
ucts in the US was shaped by the development of accounting de-
vices such as the FICO Score which allowed market calculations to
be undertaken and, at least for some time, depended upon.
This focus on accounting devices, while providing a strong
foundation to theorize heterachical modes of accounting, poses
some questions. Much of the literature on devices focuses on single
technologies and their effects (e.g. Preda (2006) on the stock
market ticker; Espeland and Sauder (2007) on law school rankings;
Pollock and D'Adderio (2012) on Gartner's “magic quadrant”; and
Power (2015) on the Impact Case Study). These singular devices
function like obligatory points of passage; they format and edit the
things and people that are brought through them, while they
remain static ﬁlters. This conceptualization of devices does not
consider the possibilities of dynamic, interacting and overlapping
performative struggles between a multiplicity of devices (Kjellberg
& Helgesson, 2006). Hence, departing from the focus on singular
mediating instruments, we propose thinking of an “ecology of de-
vices” that Star and Ruhleder (1996; Star, 1999; Monteiro, Pollock,
Hanseth, & Williams, 2013) describe as “infrastructure”.
2.7. Summary and critical appreciation: going beyond accounting's
hierarchical consciousness
In spite of the lateral concern in research on accounting in
networks and supply chains, this literature emphasizes hierarchical
ambitions by a focal ﬁrm exercising power over subsidiaries. More
critical literature has conceived of accounting as operating from a
territorializing centre in ways that, perhaps in style different but
not in effect, parallel a focal ﬁrm. And even when and where ac-
counting has been investigated as a matter of mediations and
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tion and closure. This tends to reify accounting's hierarchical con-
sciousness: Management accounting remains the “centre of
calculation” where control of peripheral activities takes place and
from where power is exercised. Imagined as centre, accounting
allows “action at distance” (Robson, 1992), projecting its powers to
the periphery. Whilst there may be no single actor in the centre,
there is a centre that controls activities and exercises power. Even if
void at its core, the Panopticon remains a centralist control mech-
anism; it is a gutted Leviathan, still a colossus towering above or-
ganizations and society. Our reading of extant research echoes
Hopwood's diagnosis that even “the so called new management
accountings still tend to maintain this hierarchical orientation” and
that “although there is a rhetoric of change and redirection in the
name of keeping pace with commercial realities, in practice the
implications of that rhetoric or research have been highly con-
strained” (1996: 589e590). Hence in order to keep pace with
“commercial realities” such as eBay, Airbnb and Uber we suggest
moving beyond the constrained vocabulary currently at our
disposal. The concept of evaluative infrastructure represents such
an attempt at conceptual re-tooling with the aim to grapple with
the new disruptive phenomenon of platform organization and in so
doing think accounting as heterarchical practice.
Conceptually, this implies three in(ter)ventions. First, it means a
shift from mediating accounting devices to overlapping and inter-
acting devices forming a dynamic network of control technologies
which we describe as infrastructure. We suggest understanding
devices in their systematic interplaydas infrastructures that
organize economic exchange occurring on platforms more sys-
tematically and fundamentally than single devices. This highlights
the relational aspect of infrastructures: infrastructures are not
singular mediating devices that strive for referentiatlity between
objects and representations; rather, evaluative infrastructures
generate relations (not references) between things, people and
ideas.
Second, we propose theorizing the relationship between ac-
counting devices and the world differently: rather than speaking of
territorializations we highlight the generative element of evalua-
tive infrastructures. We capture this quality through arguing that
evaluative infrastructures disclose new worlds: they do not simply
measure (capture, calculate) what is there, or what a centre
imagines there to be, nor do they territorialize (fence in, colonize,
envelop) life-worlds. Rather, we are interested in accounting as an
infrastructure that discloses objects, akin to physical infrastructures
like early US railways that create the very possibility for phenom-
ena such as urbanization to occur. Translated into the context of
platform organization: evaluative infrastructures do not calculate
what is there but disclose newworlds through creating objects that
are not somuch the outcomes of programmatic aspirations, but of a
surplus of data and traces, which produce new possibilities of
discovery and invention.
Third, we depart from the “centre of calculation” view of ac-
counting. We argue that in evaluative infrastructures power is
centralized, while control is radically decentralized. We describe
this form of power as protocol (Deleuze, 1992; Galloway, 2004;
Lessig, 1999). Protocol represents a form of power that conﬁgures
platform and other distributed organizational settings by estab-
lishing the directions of ﬂows and priorities. It is a form of power
that, in principle, works by decentralizing control in the sense that
platforms enable users (producers and buyers) to audit product
quality and deﬁne user experience; on eBay, Uber and Airbnb, for
instance, users evaluate each transaction and thus control is de-
facto outsourced and decentralized. Yet, there is the important
caveat that information is centrally collected by the platform owner
who is thus in a position to analyse, mine and sell data (Facebook orGoogle ads); equally, the platform owner is in a position to use the
data to drive certain transactions (e.g. Uber surge). Hence, we face
intricate power relations in platforms’ accounting regime: whilst
control of goods and services is radically decentralized, power is
concentrated in the hands of the platform owner. We will use the
concept of protocol in order to analyse this intricate relationship
between control and power.
In the next section we will develop the concept of evaluative
infrastructures and provide the extended case study of eBay as
illustration of its mechanisms and effects.
3. Evaluative infrastructures
3.1. Infrastructure's modalities and functions
Although the notion of infrastructure has been occasionally
evoked in accounting research (see Poon’s (2009) notion of infra-
structural market device; Miller’s (2008; Kurunm€aki & Miller,
2013) numerical infrastructures; Miller and Power’s (2013) calcu-
lative infrastructures; or more recently Power’s (2015) description
of a transorganizational sociotechnical infrastructure) a systematic
exploration of the term infrastructure remains a desideratum, as
Power (2015) posited.
Infrastructure is a “conceptually unruly” (Larkin, 2013, p. 329)
termwhich derives its intellectual attraction from amulti-modality
which refuses to follow the categorizations of theworld in social vs.
technical, material vs. symbol and global vs. local. Mostly we think
of infrastructures as technical achievements. In reality, they are
assemblages of technical artefacts, institutional arrangements,
cultural habits and social conventions (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch,
1987; Hughes, 1983). A simple example illustrates the point: the
technical infrastructure of roads requires a shared cultural under-
standing of how to use them (think of the skills it takes to cross a
road in New Delhi as opposed to New York) as well as an organi-
zational and institutional infrastructure (car manufacturers, petrol
stations, insurance companies, parliaments making laws, police
and law enforcement agencies executing them and so on) to
become operational. Hence, in infrastructure, the technical and the
social are inextricably intertwined (Larkin, 2013). For instance,
Elyachar (2012) shows how micro-ﬁnance is built upon the notion
of “infrastructure as people” (Simone, 2004): here, the social con-
nections between people provide the infrastructure for ﬁnancial
transactions to occur. Moreover, infrastructures are simultaneously
material and symbolic systems: even mundane infrastructure
projects are inherently socio-political projections, as Harvey and
Knox (2012) have shown in their study on transport infrastruc-
ture in Peru. There, roads were not only concrete paths connecting
people; but also pathways of the collective imagination towards
future political integration, economic growth and social welfare.
Hence the building of a highway and other infrastructures is as
much a political project as it is an engineering task (see Dalakoglou,
2010; Harvey & Knox, 2012; Schwenkel, 2015). Finally, in-
frastructures have the ability to span the dichotomy of global and
local. As Star and Ruhleder (1996: 114) argued, an “infrastructure
occurs when the tension between local and global is resolved.” In
other words, infrastructure is a medium that connects the local
train station with the global rail network: only when this bridging
occurs, we can speak of infrastructure (Bowker, Baker, Millerand, &
Ribes, 2010). This alludes to the temporal dimension of infra-
structure: it is a dynamic assemblage that is evolving and changing;
infrastructure “is” only if and when heterogeneous sets of elements
are put into relation with each other to accomplish possibilities of
exchange (Star & Ruhleder, 1996).
In sum, infrastructures can be provisionally deﬁned as “material
forms that allow for the possibility of exchange over space” (Larkin,
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this deﬁnition that need unpacking. First, because of this radically
relational character infrastructures need to be understood as
ecologies (Star & Ruhleder, 1996; referencing; Bateson, 1972; Star,
1999; Bowker et al., 2010; Monteiro et al., 2013). Infrastructures
emerge by relating heterogeneous elements e people, language,
numbers, categories, cultures, practices, artefacts but also pipes and
hard-wired circuits. They form networks that bring people and
things into proximity to each other. This is obvious when we think
of railroad as infrastructure e but also of social infrastructure that
in- or excludes people (Simone, 2004). Equally, cognitive in-
frastructures that group things (organic food, fast food, genetically
modiﬁed food, etc.) or people (citizen, resident, tourist, asylum
seeker, etc.) are relational. Standards (Lampland & Star, 2009),
classiﬁcations (Bowker & Star, 1999) and categorizations
(Schneiberg & Berk, 2010) are further examples of such cognitive
infrastructures that produce and order heterogeneous elements
into distinct groups. The corollary of this insights is that in-
frastructures are not obligatory points of passage that format, edit
or reference a reality; rather they are relational in that they create
the possibility for exchange between elements over space.
Second, infrastructures need to be understood as generative.
They do not only connect pre-given elements within a landscape;
rather they produce a landscape through disclosing new elements
and relations. Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (1999: 190) deﬁne
disclosure as “capacity of coordinated practices to create an open-
ness wherein things and people can show up”. To disclose means to
open up a space that was hitherto unknown. Take the example of
Edwards' (2010) study on knowledge infrastructures that underpin
debates on climate change. He argued that we never “experience”
global climate because climate is by deﬁnition a local affair. So how
come we can talk about “global climate change”? How do we
“know” global climate? Edwards shows that it is a global knowl-
edge infrastructure that consists of archives that store historical
data on climate; of hundreds of thousands of technological sensors
and other data collection points on land, in sea and in the air that
measure current conditions; of computers to collect and process
data into meaningful information; of models that allow calculation
of trends; of paradigms that enable scientists to collaborate, but
also disagree productively; and ﬁnally of institutions such as the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an independent or-
ganization that reviews research on climate change and issues re-
ports on what is accepted and what contested. “Ultimately”,
Edwards (2010: 8 and 19) argues, “this knowledge infrastructure
is the reasonwhywe can ‘think globally’ about climatic change. […]
Get rid of the infrastructure and you are left with claims you can't
back up, facts you can't verify, comprehension you can't share, and
data you can't trust.” Edwards' study highlights the disclosing
function of infrastructures: without the knowledge infrastructure,
there would be no “global climate” as object to debate. It is in this
sense that infrastructures disclose new objects: they open up the
possibility for new objects to emerge, to take on speciﬁc shapes and
meanings. They are practical “ontological experiments” (Jensen &
Morita, 2015). With the characteristic of disclosing we emphasize
this generative aspect of infrastructures that has been merely
alluded to previously (Lezaun, 2006; Power, 2015).
Third, infrastructures embody distinct political rationalities and
engender a speciﬁc “apparatus of governmentality” (Foucault,
2010; Larkin, 2013). Every infrastructure is political as the bridge
example in Winner's seminal paper (1980) illustrates. But not only
physical infrastructures exercise power; categorical infrastructures
(Schneiberg & Berk, 2010) shape perceptions, guide attention and
pattern “structures of intentionality” (Goodwin quoted in Bowker
& Star, 1999, p. 287). As such, infrastructures do more than
enabling a “centre of calculation” to act at distance (Latour, 1986;Robson, 1992). Rather, infrastructures are a form of control that
determines the potentiality of any place within the network,
deﬁning what is possible and actual (to paraphrase Hopwood,
1987). Therein lies the speciﬁcity of the power of infrastructure
(and analytically speaking, its departure from Foucault-inspired
governmentality studies). Disciplinary power as deﬁned by Fou-
cault is about enclosure (territorialization) of things and people,
whilst control is about managing ﬂows (Deleuze, 1992). Infra-
structure has to be analysed as control and disciplinary power.
Galloway and Thacker (2004) developed the concept of protocol to
analyse this pair as distributed control and centralized power.
Protocols are deﬁned as “the conventional rules and standards that
govern relationships within networks” with the aim to “main-
taining organization and control in networks” (Galloway& Thacker,
2004, p. 8 and 9; see also; Lessig, 1999). The prototype for this form
of control is the Internet: its information infrastructure is governed
by protocols that control exchange whilst encouraging communi-
cation. Power may be centralized in those places that write and
maintain protocol, but control itself is decentralized. This is a crit-
ical extension of the governmentality concept that does not
differentiate between power and control (Deleuze, 1992). In
contradistinction, protocol puts emphasis on the intricate, perhaps
even paradoxical, relationship between distributed control and
centralized power Fig. 1.
3.2. The evaluative dimension of infrastructures
What makes infrastructures’ evaluative quality? Evaluative in-
frastructures include rankings, ratings, reviews, tests, audits, as-
sessments and other evaluation mechanisms (Antal, Hutter, &
Stark, 2015; Kornberger, Justesen, Madsen, & Mouritsen, 2015).
Through their mechanisms and practices, these evaluations
constitute as their corollary orders of worth. Put metaphorically,
evaluative infrastructures are the invisible pipes and wires that
underpin what Power has described as audit society (Power, 1997).
This concept of evaluation derives from economic sociology (e.g.
Karpik, 2010) and an emerging body of work concerned with
valuation (see Antal et al., 2015; Beckert & Aspers, 2011;
Kornberger et al., 2015; Lamont, 2012; Vollmer, Mennicken, &
Preda, 2009). This scholarship shares the premise that value is
not an objective property of a good, nor a subjective preference of a
person, but the outcome of practices and processes of valuation.
Whilst much extant research has focused on moments of valuation
(Antal et al., 2015) or singular valuation devices (Muniesa, Millo, &
Callon, 2007) the concept of evaluative infrastructures puts
emphasis on the distributed, systematic nature of valuation pro-
cesses that underpin platform organization.
We are now in a position to deﬁne evaluative infrastructure: it
consists of an ecology of devices that disclose values of actions,
events and objects in heterarchically organized systems (such as
platforms) through the maintenance of protocol. The following
extended example of eBay's evaluative infrastructure illustrates the
applicability of the concept for the analysis of accounting practices
in platform organization. As stressed at the outset of this paper, the
aim of the narrative is not to arrive at intellectual closure but to
spark curiosity regarding how an empirical research agenda based
on the concept of evaluative infrastructures might unfold.
4. Evaluative infrastructure at work: illustrations from eBay
eBay (originally AuctionWeb) is an online auction platform that
has grown rapidly since its founding in 1996 from a collectables
marketplace with a small community of users to a global platform
with over 150 million buyers and 700 million items for sale,
generating $2.57 billion in annual transaction-related revenues.
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infrastructures (Baron, 2001), which Stone, Nikitkov, and Miller
(2014: 357) describe as “the world's largest and most widely
imitatedMCS [management control system]”. Providing knowledge
about people that would otherwise be private such as their repu-
tation, history, and status (Wolf & Muhanna, 2005), and estab-
lishing the properties of products as the foundation of enforceable
contract (Lewis, 2011), the evaluative infrastructure provided
anonymous and remote individuals who were unlikely to have
repeat interactions and were selling items that cannot be touched,
inspected, or veriﬁed with the trust to transact (Baron, 2001, p. 245;
Cabral & Hortacsu, 2004; Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002; Adams,
Hosken, & Newberry, 2006; Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, &
Reeves, 2007). It did this, moreover, without the ability to directly
control or assure the quality, safety or legality of the products and
the people who operate on the site. Like all platform organizations,
eBay maintained “no control over the quality, safety or legality of
the items advertised, the truth or accuracy of the listings, [or] the
ability of sellers to sell items or the ability of buyers to buy items”
(eBay User Agreement, 2008).
eBay provides an advantageous setting to consider platform
organization, the development of novel forms of accounting
alongside its classical counterparts, and the opportunities and
challenges of moving our analytical thinking beyond a hierar-
chical consciousness. However, like other platform organizations
eBay is highly secretive (Stone et al., 2014). Therefore, while well
aware of the potential for some bias and also the need for
further in-depth studies, we have gathered data for this section
from a wide variety of primary and secondary sources such as
investigatory journalism and academic research. This section has
also been sent to and informally discussed with a member of
eBay Labs with the aim to check accuracy and explore its
propositions.
4.1. Ebay's evaluative infrastructure
eBay's evaluative infrastructure originally consisted simply of a
public discussion board called the “Feedback Forum” and unique
user names assigned to each registered email address. These wereFig. 1. Summary of modalities and functions of infrastructure.features created initially as a means of easing the problem of
directly intervening in and adjudicating disputes between an ever-
growing set of users. As eBay's founder, Pierre Omidyar (2014),
recalls,
“About sixmonths after I created eBay, I started receiving a spate
of complaints. Everyonewas complaining about each other. I felt
very much like I was a parent who had to adjudicate the
brothers beating each other up. It was like, “He started it!” “No,
he started it.” I realized this was going to be a big problem if it
kept going this way”.
The evaluative infrastructure created to solve this problem
provided a means of distributing the task of management that had
originally and painstakingly been undertaken in-house. On the
Feedback Forum, Baron (2001: 246) notes, “members established
informal standards, provided feedback on other members' perfor-
mance, and policed the site”. Rather quickly, an informal neigh-
bourhood watch group, “The Posse”, even emerged to collectively
determine and enforce against fraud (Hoyt & Baron, 2001). As one
member recounts: we would, “ban together and ﬁnd the bad guys
and make their lives miserable […] If we heard of someone who
was defrauding people, we would all email them and tell them if
they didn't make it upwewould go to the police” (Phillips in Cohen,
2002, p. 52).
A private ordering emerged; it was said (perhaps overstated)
that “trust on the site was so high and the feeling of community so
strong that it was common for sellers to ship items even before they
had received bidders’ payments” (Baron, 2001, p. 26). On this basis,
eBay quickly added additional features. This started with a system
allowing users to review each other as “positive”, “neutral” or
“negative” and to leave a line of feedback or description (such as
that at the bottom of Fig. 2). Next, these reviews were aggregated
into numerical scores for each user (positive reviews added a point,
negative reviews subtracted one, and neutral reviews had no ef-
fect), and presented in terms of different chronological periods (see
Figs. 2 and 3). Following quickly thereafter, speciﬁc categories (item
description, communication, dispatch time, and postage and
packaging charges) for reviews were added based on the common
topics of user reviews. These features provided the digital traces for
making yet more distinctions and qualiﬁcations: cumulative scores
were associated with the attainment of different coloured stars and
shooting stars (see Fig. 4 below) and new privileges such as “power
seller” status as punishments such as being “NARUed” or banned
from the site (Klein, Lambertz, Spagnolo, & Stahl, 2009; Zervas,
Proserpio, & Byers, 2015).
Within a matter of a few short years, eBay had populated an
uncertain and potentially unknowable market with an ecology of
ﬁgures, stars, signs, and symbols, as illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3
above. What were once anonymous and remote buyers and
sellers wary of online commerce, had become multi-dimensional
representations (usernames, histories, feedback ratings, points,
stars, and other descriptors) transacting at a signiﬁcant scale,
resulting in what we analyse as eBay's evaluative infrastructure. As
already alluded to above, it is important to note that eBay can be
read as a more or less traditional hierarchal ﬁrm with 12,000 em-
ployees; yet, what we are interested in is the fact that its value
creation occurs on a platformwhich mobilises hundreds of millions
of users and billions of dollars of transactions without eBay being
able to control any of these fundamental activities through its
traditional accounting regime. Hence in the following sections, we
critically discuss key aspects of the development of eBay's evalua-
tive infrastructure in relation to its properties of relationality,
disclosure and protocol.
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The ﬁrst key feature of the development of eBay's evaluative
infrastructure has been to constitute performance, particularly in
terms of emerging, distantiated and often quantiﬁed notions of
quality and trust, as the matter of relations. An inspection of the
ecology of devices that make up the feedback forum and user
proﬁle (Figs. 2 and 3 above) shows that although one can discern an
overall score for each user, in the case shown in Fig. 3 it is 558,
linked with a star colour, the proﬁles do not deﬁnewhat is ‘good’ or
‘bad’. This happens because the overall score measures the volume
of positive transactions rather than their consistency (a new user
with 10 positive reviews would have the same score as a user with
100 positive reviews and 90 negative onesdhence, notice the “Tip”
in Fig. 4). This also happens because users have different prefer-
ences, for instance, for communication over dispatch time, or for
recent transactions rather than historical ones. All of these details
can be found but they do not add up in to one stable object as a
singular rating or ranking would do. While it may be relatively easy
to discern proverbial lemons, there are many ways to order and
relate to all of the other proﬁles that vary on many and overlapping
terms such as for example the four dimensions produced in Fig. 2
which remain un-commensurated. Likewise, the written feedback
that has no discernible structure but can be cast around any
possible subject of concern. The relational character of feedback
makes it potentially surprising and generative of new issues and
possibilities.
As a result, the evaluative infrastructures can be seen to evaluate
and calculate without a deﬁnition of what precisely is ‘good’
(‘standard’ or ‘normal’ in management accounting language; Miller
& O’Leary, 1987). Instead, they engage with information asymmetry
dynamically, creating rather than settling debates about people,
goods, and qualities. Possibly as a feature intended to continue to
offer competition and lower the barriers for entry, the picture
which the platform seeks to provide is not the clear and parsimo-
nious one of ranking and ratings (Pollock & D'Adderio, 2012, p.
258), but rather a complex set of possibilities for making connec-
tions which may not immediately be clear. Accounting, in other
words, operates by creating relations between actions, objects and
preferences, so as to engineer possibilities of a match.
Indicatively, studies show that, without any clear ranking,
buyers “inspect and consider many other detailed pieces of infor-
mation […] such as individual-auction level feedback reviews”
(Weinberg & Davis, 2005, p. 1619). Sellers too engage in a complex
set of activities to engineer a match. Consistent with the accounting
literature, sellers engage in gaming activities (Argyris,1990) such as
“shrilling” and “feedback bombing”, as well as getting caught up inFig. 2. summaself-fulﬁlling prophecies, whereby initial negative feedback in-
creases the chances of receiving subsequent negative feedback
(Cabral & Hortacsu, 2004:; Saeedi, Shen, & Sundaresan, 2013).
Sellers, however, also engage in strategies of “feedback and repu-
tation management” (eBay, 2015a): a Goffmanian impression
management 2.0 in which customers are segmented and a partic-
ular kind of a match is sought. Perhaps the starkest examples of
such relational work can be seen on dating platforms such as
match.com (the name is instructive!): the question to answer from
the evaluative infrastructure is not somuch ‘is s/he a good person?’,
but ‘is s/he the right person for me?’. Platforms accomplish this
matching through their evaluative infrastructures which create the
possibilities of an exchange that is not governed by a-priori deter-
mined categories or rules, but by the endogenously emerging
properties which data production and mining allows (Roscoe &
Chillas, 2014; Weinberg & Davis, 2005).
This evaluative regime is sometimes argued by platform owners
to be less disciplining and more empirically driven than ordinal
rankings and lists. But there are reasons to give pause to such
optimism. Firstly, as Roscoe and Chillas (2014) show in their anal-
ysis of the online dating platform eHarmony, the infrastructure of
matching might provide only an illusion of choice. While consti-
tuting the searcher as “the one who controls, selects and manipu-
lates potential matches”, at the moment of selection, “it is
impossible for either the searcher or the searched for to manipulate
a choice in a way other than the interface requires” (Roscoe &
Chillas, 2014, p. 819). Secondly, instead of opening up possibilities
for knowledge creation, evaluative infrastructure can accentuate
discrimination based on pre-existing distinctions (Gillespie, 2010:
Edelman & Luca, 2014, pp. 14e054). Indeed, research shows on a
variety of platforms, such as Upwork, Prosper, and Airbnb, those
infrastructural design choices which allow for ever more custom-
ized matching (the ability of users, for instance to display pictures
of themselves, and to display this in their proﬁle) increase the levels
of discrimination, for instance based on ethnicity (Luca, 2016).
Thirdly, evaluative infrastructures are problematic because they
constitute not only economic value but also life chances. In the case
of eBay, reputation is not “there” to facilitate exchange; rather,
reputation is the result of evaluative infrastructure's disclosing,
constituting an asset which Fourcade and Healy (2013; 2017)
described as “ubercapital”dthe form of capital arising from the
“digital record” which evaluative infrastructure unfurls. This is the
reason why reputations are bought and sold on eBay and why
sellers have sued buyers for leaving negative feedback (Med Ex-
press Inc. v Amy Nicholls and eBay Inc.; Baron, 2001). There are
even online platforms (such as traity.com) whose sole purpose is to
manage users' various forms of “ubercapital”which they acquire onry proﬁle.
Fig. 3. Feedback proﬁle.
Fig. 4. The star rating system.
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where. Attention to the elaboration of evaluative infrastructure
highlights that problematic way in which organizations constitute,
control and commodify capital from digital traces.4.3. Disclosing values
The second key feature of the development of eBay's evaluative
infrastructure has been the ongoing elaboration and stabilization
all kinds of qualities, such as reputation, trust, service, accuracy,
reliability, and even price. This process offers important reﬂections
on the notion of disclosure, and the core tensions upon which it
relies.
The concept of disclosing highlights the sense in which evalu-
ative infrastructure constitutes values neither by tracking them to
their sourcedan “infrastructure of referentiality” (Lezaun, 2006)d
nor by transposing them upon a pre-established separation of ideal
from the centredas in the case of territorialization. In developing
its infrastructure, eBay did not seek to judge participant's charac-
ters or fact check the quality of their offerings. This was precisely
the kind of centralized “adjudication” that eBay's founder sought to
avoid (Omidyar, 2014). Such adjudicationwould have limited eBay's
ability to scale, because of the resources required and because
doing so would make the company liable for the claims made in its
site. Indeed, in a series of copyright-related lawsuits, eBay has
relied on the argument that “with respect to the ’star’ system and
Power Seller’ endorsements, […] they were not more than an
indication of the amount of positive information provided by third
parties, and so eBay was not responsible [for their claims]”
(Chandler, el-Khatib, Benyoucef, von Bochman, & Adams, 2007, p.
96).
Instead, eBay created and continues to create qualities through a
process of disclosure, which is endogenous to the evaluative
infrastructure itself. As noted above, the user proﬁles and reputa-
tions ﬁrst emerged through the “private ordering” (Baron, 2001)
that the functionality of the discussion boards and user names
provided. As Cohen (2002) notes, in the early days of eBay there
were a number of distinctive users that, working with the crowd,
9 A fascinating example of relationality is from the UK car insurance ﬁrm Ad-
miral, which offered variable car insurance rates based on Facebook posts of its
customers: the use of many exclamation marks for instance was read as indicative
of assertiveness and hence aggressive driving behaviour. After a public outcry on
privacy grounds Admiral had to shelf its idea e for now. See https://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/02/admiral-to-price-car-insurance-based-
on-facebook-posts.
10 This is evidenced by Facebook's huge psychological experiment: as the
Guardian reported, “Unbeknown to users Facebook had tampered with the news
feeds of nearly 700,000 people, showing them an abnormally low number of either
positive or negative posts. The experiment aimed to determine whether the com-
pany could alter the emotional state of its users.” Even for the benevolent observer
it must have become obvious that the difference between purporting and pro-
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to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The addition of quantitative feedback ratings
built upon and provided the conditions to enhance this private
ordering. Ratings, which users could initially leave for each other
even when they had not engaged in a transaction, largely reﬂected
the ordering of the discussion boards. These digital traces allowed
for further disclosure of reputation: the making of distinctions such
as ‘power sellers’ and different coloured and shooting stars, and
with eBay's in-house research labdsomething most of not all
platform organizations maintaindever more differences and dis-
tinctions (Duh, Sunder, & Jamal, 2002; eBay Research, 2015).
As platform owners, eBay did not seek to extend accounting as a
means of territorialization from the centre. Rather, they mobilized
accounting throughout constant and continued experimentation
(Ungerleider, 2014) and mining of information endogenous to the
site. This is highlighted by the puzzlement of economists that ﬁnd
evaluative infrastructures to be capable of sustaining markets
despite being plagued by factual inaccuracies, misleading claims,
and unrepresentative assessments (Tadelis, 2016; Resnick,
Zeckhauser, Swanson, & Lockwood, 2006). Evaluative in-
frastructures work because they do something other than verify
and validate the world as it is. Rather, they disclose the world that
the digital traces and extensive data mining provide: a process of
what Amoore and Piotukh (2015) describe as “little analytics” in
which correlations and relations are found that have very little
meaning a priori. Indicatively accounting was not a matter of
imposing a pre-determined deﬁnition of “reputation” onto the
platform users. In fact, eBay was concerned not to ﬁgure out for
itself what “reputation” was; a thorough investigation of what
lurked behind the numbers (the pursuit of referentiality) would
have challenged its status, so essential to its business model, as
merely the “modern incarnation of the traditional newspaper
classiﬁed advertisement and automated and accelerated for the
twenty-ﬁrst century” (Gentry v eBay in Cohen, 2002, p. 309).
However, the development of this evaluative infrastructure re-
veals that the relational world is not entirely immune to its ‘real
world’ correlates. In response to high-proﬁle accounts of fraud,
gaming and feedback bombing, eBay was forced to extend its
knowledge beyond its referential system through the addition of
formal rules, an insurance system, a third-party payment system,
veriﬁed accounts, and an in-house investigatory unit, Safe Harbor,
to prosecute fraud (Gonzalez, 2003; Stone et al., 2014). eBay,
however, has only engaged in such activities reluctantly. As Stone
et al. (2014: 368) note: “evidence from knowledgeable users,
including statements on the eBay user forums, indicated minimal
enforcement of these rules, except for the most egregious violators
(Brunker, 2002; Walton, 2006)”.
eBay has also sought to manage the development of its ‘com-
munity’ throughout its history. Early eBay members were suspi-
cious that the inﬂuential user, “Skippy”, may have been an eBay
employee (Cohen, 2002). Similarly, although eBay maintains an
extensive consultation process for making changes to the Feedback
Forum, users have criticized what they perceive as the willingness
of eBay to make changes intended simply to boost its revenue
model, for instance in favor of high-volume sellers (Sandoval,
2002). Users explain, for instance:
“The owners decided that all the users were untrustworthy, out
to create scams, cheat each other, but worst of all, cheat eBay out
of their rightful fees. They felt they needed to control the users,
and began manipulating them” (CM Qxq in AuctionWatch, eBay
Outlook, quoted in Boyd, 2002)
And:“Kind of makes you wonder about the meaning of eBay com-
munity and if it ever really meant anything to the leaders of
eBay” (CMOldMan inAuctionWatch, eBay Outlook, quoted in
Boyd, 2002).
Such quotes highlight that while infrastructural disclosure may
be endogenous, it is also inﬂuenced by what might be called the
“hidden cursor” of platform organizations: the commercial
imperative for platform owners to maximize revenues via trafﬁc to
their platform.
The hidden cursor directs attention to the point that platform
organizations rely upon two types of accounting. One type of ac-
counting is conventionally hierarchical: as a ﬁrm, eBay accounts for
its proﬁts, assets and costs and controls hierarchically its in-house
employees. Another type is the accounting that makes up the
platform's ability to connect and relate millions of suppliers and
buyers. As a platform, eBay's accounting mechanisms make it a
producer of classiﬁcations looking for traces and combinations
which can be pulled together to disclose the world in a new way.
Unfolding in this way, evaluative infrastructures operate without a
stable referent.9 However, the classiﬁcations that matter are driven
not only with a view to connectivity between seller and buyer but
(also) by a commercial imperative to turn a value into a commodity
or a resource for exploitation. This involves assembling relations
that blend what is sought and what is knowndthey unfold dis-
tinctions of a community and at the same time they actively
cultivate a community of a particular kind. Precisely because the
hierarchical features of accounting persist to some degree, evalu-
ative infrastructures create kinds of transparency in which it is
difﬁcult to decipher the commercial imperative upon which many
design features are based from the collection of correlations, facts
and digital features upon which those imperatives depend.104.4. Centralized power, decentralized control
The third feature of the development of the evaluative infra-
structure pertains to the form of power which it assembles. The
development and maintenance of evaluative infrastructure has
established eBay as centre of power. Even though eBay asserts no
responsibility for the claims made on its platform, it maintains
strict control over the infrastructure and the data which it gener-
ates. Indeed, eBay has aggressively protected the data on its site
from “crawlers” and auction aggregators (see eBay v Bidder's Edge,
2000) and it has engaged in secretivework tomaintain and develop
gaps in its infrastructure through work, for instance with law
enforcement (Boyd, 2002; Duh et al., 2002). This activity affords
eBay an extraordinary amount of power. By virtue of its ownership
of the platform (as well as the possibilities that the data generates),
eBay is able to draw boundaries on what can and cannot be traded,
outlawing, for instance, the sale of ﬁrearms, drugs, body parts, andvoking has been conﬂated in the disclosing powers of platform accounting.
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place, by, for instance, establishing PayPal as the site's de-facto
payment mechanism (Cohen, 2002; Long, 2010). This picture por-
trays eBay as powerful actor; a spider in the middle of its web.
Yet, and somehow paradoxically, the source of this power lies in
the distribution of control. Crucially, eBay's proprietary interfaces,
from discussion boards to the feedback forum and even its fraud
detection system, depend upon its users to work. They require that
users evaluate, assess, control, and follow up what their fellow
users do, creating much of the information that eBay's evaluative
infrastructure collects, analysis and uses to organize its platform.
eBay users become the auditors of platform activities, and in-house
fraud investigation and protection becomes only a reluctantly-used
last resort (Stone et al., 2014, p. 368). It is for this reasons that eBay's
founder frequently states that “eBay's success as a company de-
pends upon the success of the community” (Omidyar, quoted in
O'Connor, 2012): the business model of all platform organizations
(few ﬁxed assets and extraordinary scale) depends on the widest
possible distribution of control.
This relationship between power and control can be described
analytically as protocol (Deleuze, 1992; Galloway, 2004; Lessig,
1999). Protocol can be deﬁned as set of rules that governs ex-
change over distance. Protocol sets out the possibilities of exchange
(say roads you could travel) without determining actual usage
(highway or scenic route). In platform organization, protocol de-
scribes the widely-adopted standards that regulate the ﬂow of
economic exchange. The production of these standards on plat-
forms requires that the centralization of powermoves hand in hand
with the decentralization of control. It resonates with the ﬁnding
that eBay's success is the result not of the quality of its reputation
accounting system per se e its better-funded rivals such as Auc-
tionUniverse, OnSale, and Yahoo!Auctions had reputation ac-
counting systems that were equally capable e but to the early
constitution of that infrastructure as protocol (Cohen, 2002, p. 96).
Illustratively, eBay's power emerged through its ability to enrol
its users within its distributed system of control. Well-aware of its
reliance on platform users, eBay (like other platform owners)
developed and continues to develop its infrastructure toward
commercial ends through a series of cautious experiments, beta
releases, listening exercises, and pilots (see e.g. Kramer, Guillory, &
Hancock, 2014). Rather than constructing a “centre of calculation”
(Robson, 1992) eBay established dependencies and obligations in
order to attain its power. This mutual dependency was highlighted
by a series of insurgencies led by disgruntled users in response to
changes to the Feedback Forum throughout its development. In July
2000, for instance, a group of eBay users calling themselves the
Discuss New Features or “DNF Posse” mobilized their eBay user
names and discussion boards (sometimes extending them onto
alternative websites such as the Online Traders Web Alliance and
AuctionWatch) to organize a campaign to move one million eBay
auctions to competing platforms in protest of its recent changes to
site policiesdthe so-called “Million AuctionMarch” (MAM) (Cohen,
2002).
This form of power, which is dependent on the distribution of
control, may sound refreshing but, as Galloway (2004: 13), drawing
on Deleuze (1992), highlights, “protocol is to control societies as the
panopticon is to disciplinary societies”. Indeed, it develops and
operates through a tension between the distribution of control and
the centralization of power. On the one hand, the platform owners
gain ever more power to make use of platform data and to design
protocol rules. On the other hand, the platform owners gain this
power through the distribution of control. Users may gain control
but, because the emergence evaluative infrastructure as protocol
creates ever bigger network effects (Haucap & Heimeshoff, 2014),
users lose power to resist or even exit the platforms as switchingcosts increase with every new user. What we witness is an
endogenous lock-in. This was illuminated starkly by the failure of
the MAM to create viable competing protocol owner (Cohen, 2002,
p. 259). It alludes to the tricky political economy of network effects
in platform capitalism: as in the market for relationships, “low
barriers to entry encourage a steady stream of new innovators and
niche operations, typically network effects and economies of scale
mean that the market is dominated by a small number of com-
panies” (Roscoe & Chillas, 2014, p. 805).
In sum, protocol helps us to understand the power/control
nexus that characterizes evaluative infrastructures. Firstly, power
and control do not ﬂow in only one direction (as in, for instance, the
development of rules within an outsourced network) but develop
at the same time, and in different directions. Secondly, power in
platform organization lies in the number of users and big data,
rather than in the ability to discipline and control individuals
directly. Once platform owners encounter their users, of course,
they face the classical task of extracting and controlling labour. But,
they do not necessarily have to be controlled as individuals; rather,
with each new user, eBay recruits an additional auditor (in
disguise) of platform activity.
5. Implications of evaluative infrastructures for accounting
research
This concluding section will explicate the analytical vocabulary
that allows us to characterize evaluative infrastructures as novel
mode of accounting and to go beyond the “hierarchical con-
sciousness of accounting” which Hopwood (1996) called for.
5.1. Relationality
The case of eBay highlights the infrastructural character of a
heterachical mode of accounting. Evaluative infrastructures are
assemblages of heterogeneous elements that create relations be-
tween elements across space and time. As such, we showed that
they are not singular mediating devices that strive for referentiality
between objects and representations. Rather, they are ecologies of
interacting devices that generate relations (not references) be-
tween people's actions, behaviours, preferences and objects.
The concept of infrastructure highlights this notion of relation-
ality as opposed to referentiality in accounting research. Referen-
tiality is a key notion in accounting, even when it departs from the
idea of representational accuracy. As Power highlights, the practice
of accounting and auditing typically relies on the assertion that
realities “can be veriﬁed by the appropriate interpretation and
collection of evidence” (Power, 1997, p. 69)dhence the evidentiary
primacy of the notion of an ‘audit trail’ as a series of traces that can
be followed to corroborate accounting's claim. Accounting re-
searchers, along with historians (Daston & Galison, 2010; Porter,
1996) illuminating the social speciﬁcity of the nature of knowl-
edge, have long problematized this notion of referentiality (Stamp,
1981; Power, 1997; Macintosh, Shearer, Thornton,&Welker, 2000).
Yet, they have far from discarded it altogether. In place of repre-
sentational accuracy, they advance the notion of “likeness”
(Mouritsen, 2011) and the power of accounting to bring one rep-
resentation of reality, among many possibilities, into existence
(Miller & Power, 2013). Here referentiality is not abandoned, but
reiﬁed with power; it is maintained to exist but only through will.
Indeed, much of the accounting literature suggests that accounting
is about naming things that are brought to exist and then given a
stable form as an unambiguous bureaucratic referent. In this sense
accounting “constructs” its objects: the retired person is constituted
as an economic agent (Graham, 2010), the brand is reframed as an
asset (Power, 1992b), the ofﬁce is transformed to be efﬁcient (Jeacle
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counting builds a stable reference through a singular device or
evidentiary path, as a matter of developing a clear programmatic
agenda.
Evaluative infrastructures differ: they are not referential but
relational. They are part and product of an ecology of devices that
connect, and through this work of connecting they change the
objects they relate to each other. Through connecting events, ac-
tions, behaviours, decisions (clicks) and assessments by third
parties on eBay, new qualities such as reputation or trust come to
the fore. These qualities are not a result of referencing or trailing,
but of relations that the infrastructure engenders without altering
the connected objects themselves. Take the example of credit
scoring technologies of online lenders such as Wonga, a UK based
online lender of last resort (Deville, 2013). Within six minutes an
application is processed, and if approved within 15 min the money
will be wired to the customer's bank account. The key challenge is
evaluating the customer's creditworthiness. Wonga does not rely
on third party scoring technology but has developed its own
evaluative infrastructure: It searches through 8000 different data
points to evaluate a potential lender, including: From which
browser was the site accessed? With which device was the site
accessede a cutting edge smartphone or an old desktop computer?
Was the site accessed directly, via a search engine or an ad? How
often was the site visited by the potential lender? And at which
time of the day (or night) did the customer inquire for a loan? Even
the credit application process feeds into the evaluation: the time a
customer takes to ﬁll out the online form is recorded and feeds into
the overall credit score (assuming that a creditworthy person types
quickly and makes few mistakes). Finally, the algorithm makes the
decision about the loan approval; no human is involved in the
decision-making process. As this example shows, constructing
values (i.e. creditworthiness) is not about tracing, but of constantly
re-contextualizing and drawing together a myriad of relations in
search of what could matter.
Hence, evaluative infrastructures are contextualizing machines:
they constantly link events, actions, behaviours, decisions (clicks),
assessments and other traces left unintentionally and uncon-
sciously (such as speed of typing, time of access, or browser used to
access site)e all of which are used to build aweb of context around
objects and subjects. Past buying behaviour leads to personalized
recommendations for future purchases: evaluative infrastructure
creates patterns, relentlessly connecting, comparing, and contex-
tualizing. This leads to an endogenous ordering as infrastructure-
immanent activity as opposed to external categorizations.
5.2. Disclosing
This leads to the second key insight that follows from our
analysis: the generativity of evaluative infrastructures. Operating
referentially, accounting is often said to be a matter of territoriali-
zation: of naming things so that they become bureaucratically
durable. Power (2015), for instance, quotes Lezaun (2006) who
talks about “infrastructures of referentiality” as the “creation of a
set of administrative practices and detection instruments” which
are capable of deﬁning, cornering, singularizing, counting and
controlling its objects that are made durable and controllable
through this very practices and instruments (Lezaun, 2006, p. 501).
Evaluative infrastructures, however, do not territorialize or
capture objects through their operations; rather, they disclose new
worlds. This notion of disclosing is different to its usual meaning in
ﬁnancial accounting. Disclosure as in publishing a ﬁnancial state-
mentmeans bringing into the openwhat is important yet hidden. In
our context disclosing means “to create an openness wherein
things and people can show up” as Spinosa et al. (1999) argued.Here what is important is not yet known. Instead, it is about
creating the condition for the possibility of hitherto unknown
things to surface. In this sense, disclosing is about exploration, not
exposure.
For instance, “trust” is an object that eBay's infrastructure dis-
closes: for the better part of human history, trust was an inter-
personal attribution that required judgement. And judgement
required repeated engagement with a person. Trust, as such, was
not simply there for eBay to account for. But neither was trust an
empty canvas which eBay merely needed to paint. Rather, eBay's
evaluative infrastructure disclosed a new form of relationality in
which trust between anonymous actors could come into existence:
through feedback loops, ratings, comments, and other evaluation
mechanisms trust came into existence as a quantiﬁcation. Hence, it
is unsatisfactory to say that evaluative infrastructures “reframe” or
“constitute” trust because trust is formed and disclosed via evalu-
ative infrastructures that generate opportunities to connect just
like a new highway built into wilderness discloses the opportunity
to travel, visit and settle. It is equally unsatisfactory to argue that
trust is “socially constructed”: at eBay trust is the result not of
constructions but of infrastructural disclosure that brings into be-
ing a plane of possibilities that did not exist beforehand (Lury &
Marres, 2015). This effect requires critical scrutiny as evaluative
infrastructures present classiﬁcation situations (Fourcade & Healy,
2013; 2017) that are different to traditional class(-iﬁcation): here
people are sorted out according to what the “infrastructure of
scoring” discloses, giving rise to a new “Lumpenscoretariat”
(Fourcade & Healy, 2017).
In so doing, evaluative infrastructures disclose values that
represent the resource base of economic activity. As shown, eBay's
evaluative infrastructure discloses trust as key currency without
which it could not operate. Through its evaluative infrastructure,
eBay creates the non-economic values it relies on for its economic
success. Consequently, eBay's economy is not “embedded” in so-
ciety; rather, eBay's evaluative infrastructure creates the necessary
socio-cultural conditions for its economic activity to ﬂourish. If the
(monetary) infrastructure of the traditional economy was
controlled by central banks, emerging evaluative infrastructures are
the decentralized issuers of new currencies enabling new forms of
exchange and accumulation (Beniger, 1989).
5.3. Protocol
Evaluative infrastructures produce novel apparatuses of power:
they are not centres of calculation that allow action at distance,
projecting power to the periphery. Rather, evaluative in-
frastructures produce a more differentiated regime: in evaluative
infrastructures control is radically distributed, whilst power re-
mains centralized. We suggested analysing this relation between
power and control as protocol.
Protocol is a concept in contradistinction to disciplinary power
(Deleuze, 1992). Disciplinary power reigns through minute control:
Foucault's famous analysis of the body of the soldier or the power
effects of the Panopitcon are based on a form of power that capil-
larily seeps into every fold, every crack, and controls subjects from
the inside. Of course, analytically Foucauldian power was always in
need of an author to provide strategic direction e or at least a
soufﬂeur to provide coordinating guidance. This role was mostly
more assumed than articulated in the background through big
brush schemes such as rationalization or marketization or
managerialization.
Evaluative infrastructures invite an alternative understanding of
power. They introduce the important difference between power
and control. In eBay's evaluative infrastructure control is decen-
tralized, whereas power remains centralized. eBay exercises power
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what counts and how to count, excluding users, and introducing
rules. Through its infrastructure, eBay “makes up” its users (Young,
2006). The heart of evaluative infrastructures, where the designers
of its elements and operations sit, is shrouded in mystery and se-
crecy as Canetti (1973: 253) observed so aptly: “Secrecy lies at the
heart of power”. In fact, eBay, like other platform organizations, is
notoriously secretive about its evaluative infrastructure; it is as if
the evaluation seemed to be premised on the fact that its produc-
tion has to remain secret in order to stay truthful. Whilst there can
be no doubt of the centralized power of eBay as a ﬁrm, control itself
is decentralized and distributed alongside the production processes
of eBay as a platform organization. As a ﬁrm, eBay might reproduce
accounting's hierarchical consciousness; however, as a platform,
eBay's evaluative infrastructure illustrates a heterarchical mode of
accounting. Rather than being a coordination mechanism that
provides the locus of “hard-wiring” internal control, evaluative
infrastructure enables distributed and outsourced “soft-wired”
mechanisms to control and coordinate decentralized value creation
processes.
Evaluative infrastructures, as such, are a governing apparatus in
which control is exercised as part of production and consumption
processes, and conducted by users who take on the task to judge
quality. They take part in the construction of different types of
subjectivities. these subjectivities differ from those identiﬁed by
Miller and Rose (1990) who talked of the “calculating self” and of a
“new economic citizenship” as modes of subjectivization in which
“the economy” (Miller & O'Leary, 1994) is something that subjects
encounter, receive, and work within. Here, the subject is the
outcome and result of economic power and calculative control.
eBay's evaluative infrastructure gives rise to different subjectivities,
an “entrepreneurial self”: for sure, this self is a calculating one as
well, but one that calculates others in an attempt to relate to the
world in a multitude of ways, always re-evaluating interpretations,
patterns and contexts in which objects and subjects are disclosed.
6. Conclusion: towards a research agenda of accounting for
platform organization
This paper's ambition has been to challenge accounting's hier-
archical consciousness through developing the concept of evalua-
tive infrastructure. Evaluative infrastructures are not singular
mediating devices but interacting ecologies; they do not capture or
reign in but disclose new worlds; and they do not project power
from the centre towards the periphery but exercise power through
radically decentralizing control. As the illustrative case of eBay
highlights, evaluative infrastructures focus attention on the ques-
tions of what precisely is new in the new economy of platform
organization. The periodization, which this research has alluded to
in its explication of a new organizational form, is a dangerous un-
dertaking. It implies a break which is artiﬁcially totalizing and
discontinuous. Hierarchies and markets, of course live on, even
within platform organizations; managers, not history, confront
managerial dilemmas and choose how and on what terms to
respond to them. As such, management accounting and its hierar-
chical consciousness have a signiﬁcantdand in our rendering a
perhaps sometimes deemphasizeddplace in theorizing the prev-
alent patterns of organizational change. However, it was Foucault,
the inspiration for so much of accounting's current critical theo-
rizing, that insisted and illuminated clearly the analytical beneﬁts
of thinking in terms of the assemblages of historically speciﬁc
movements that constitute social reality. In this spirit, and drawing
on Deleuze (1992), who has critically embraced Foucault to outline
the emergence of a “control society”, we offer this reading of
evaluative infrastructure as a possibility for allowing a criticaldebate of the historical differences that constitute capitalism's
evolution, and for further, more immersive, empirical studies that
would reveal additional and perhaps more complex dynamics. We
hope that evaluative infrastructure's new vocabulary is not seen as
what Freud called narcissism of minor differences but as useful
analytical tool towards conceptualizing a heterarchical mode of
accounting. The stress-test for such an endeavour is: what novel
problematizations does the concept of evaluative infrastructure
invite?
First, evaluative infrastructures give rise to new questions in
regards to the relation of accounting and time. Evaluative in-
frastructures embody expectations about the future. This can lead
to self-fulﬁlling prophecies and other forms of reversed causality in
which expectations of future behaviour shape present behaviour. A
second important temporal dynamic are network effects that might
turn infrastructures that have grown to critical mass into de-facto
standards. A third and closely related temporal dynamic of in-
frastructures are path dependency effects: because infrastructures
require substantive political, cognitive and ﬁnancial investments to
be built and maintained, they are difﬁcult to alter, even if the
function they were designed to support has changed. Together
these mechanisms engender a dynamic that shapes the evolution
of evaluative infrastructures. For instance, path dependencies and
network effects may deprive evaluative infrastructures of their
disclosing capacity and turn them into administrative machineries
(Zittrain, 2006). The playful entrepreneur gives way to the gaming
exploiter. Future research may focus on such non-linear tempo-
ralities and dynamic aspect that evaluative infrastructures bring
about.
Second, evaluative infrastructures call for an extension of the
concept of space in accounting studies. Work on double-entry
bookkeeping illustrated how a differentiated calculative space
unfolded and enveloped economic activity. Studies of mediating
devices highlight material, obligatory points of passage that format
actions as well as actors. The study of evaluative infrastructures
may reveal new socio-economic topographies that are shaped by
heterarchical accounting practices. These topographies neither
represent calculative spaces (bookkeeping), nor concrete spaces
(such as the factory ﬂoor) nor abstract spaces (such as the brand);
rather, they are emerging spaces of values (trust in eBay; skills in
LinkedIn; reputation in Airbnb) that are disclosed through evalu-
ative infrastructures. As over time different infrastructures are
layered on top of each other, they will give rise to a layering of
spaceswhich interfere or resonatewith each other inmultipleways
(Dourish & Bell, 2007). This implies a move away from the idea of
mediating devices (which assumes two spatial strata between
which to mediate) towards the image of spatial layering of new
socio-economic topographies.
Third, the focus on evaluative infrastructures extends the
expertise of accounting with potential implications for the profes-
sion. Accounting is away of knowing about theworld that supposes
a certain type of expert professional, the accountant, as the central
ﬁgure where receipts meet, sums are added up, and balances are
calculated (Power, 1992a). In evaluative infrastructures it is not the
professional accountant who does the accounting, but an assem-
blage of programmers, users (knowingly or not) and algorithms.
Hence, evaluative infrastructures may be analysed as forms of
distributed accounting akin to distributed cognition (Giere, 2002;
Hutchins, 1995). We encounter a “collective epistemic subject”
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999) where the expert is not the professional ac-
countant, but the system itself. The professional accountant may
even become de-skilled as the system becomes more intelligent
(Hutchins, 1995). For accounting studies this calls for a dynamic
perspective on the practice of accounting, shedding light not on
accounting as knowledge that is possessed and guarded by a group
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knowledge that draws on and draws in many actors, including
machines (Giere, 2002).
Forth, and closely related, evaluative infrastructures invite
further reﬂections on the role of information and communication
technology for accounting. Big data for instance is an important
precondition to and outcome of the development of evaluative
infrastructures. Big data is deﬁned by a deluge of data points,
extraordinary computing powers, and constant possibilities for
experimentation. Today's platform based ﬁrms, such as eBay, Uber
and Airbnb but also its smaller siblings in the emerging ﬁntech
industry or blockchain banking are big data ﬁrms: their compe-
tence is data creation, collection, experimentation, and analysis
(McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012). Technophile writers announce the
“end of theory” (Anderson, 2008) implying essentially that big data
will speak of and for itself. The concept of evaluative infrastructures
serves as reminder for the relentless background work that has to
be accomplished in order to turn 0/1s into voices and values.
Exploring evaluative infrastructures offers one possible conceptual
trajectory for a further critical engagement of accounting studies
with big data and other emerging phenomena (Rogaway, 2015).
Fifth, by focusing on evaluative infrastructure accounting may
enter a fruitful dialogue with organization theory and the sociology
of organization, both disciplines struggling to understand plat-
forms as alternative mode of organizing economic activity. Schol-
arship assumes that the characteristics of ties (deﬁned as either
strong, weak or missing) explain behaviour and structure of net-
works (Burt, 1995; Granovetter, 1973); similarly, trust has been
analysed as coordination mechanism in clan-like organizational
forms (Ouchi, 1980). However, platform organization such as eBay
are neither clan-like nor can a theory of linkages explain its orga-
nization; recourse to fuzzy notions such as “community” signal
scholarly helplessness. Evaluative infrastructure may be a useful
concept to further analyse and dissect part of the organizational
structure of platforms, taking into account at the same time their
material and symbolic, local and global, social and technical
dimensions.
Finally, evaluative infrastructures might spark debate about
platform organizations’ political economy. Platform organizations
in general and especially collaborative consumption are heralded as
cure against hyper-consumption and cue towards sustainability as
people share excess resources with each other (Botsman & Rogers,
2010). Others see them as “neoliberalism on steroids” (Morozov,
2013) and argue against platform capitalism and for platform co-
operativism (Scholz, 2016). An analysis of evaluative in-
frastructures approaches the phenomenon not ideologically but,
following Foucault, pragmatically: indeed, evaluative in-
frastructures are at play at Uber just as well as at its cooperative
twin, the mobility platform LaZooz. As such evaluative in-
frastructures span ideological boundaries, suggesting that rhetor-
ical disagreements are in reality based on shared intellectual and
material investments. Both Uber and LaZooz give rise to classiﬁ-
cation regimes that engender social identities, shaping life-chances
(Fourcade & Healy, 2013). Living on the wrong side of the tracks
determined the lives of many people in the 20th century; in order
to understand how life-chances are shaped in the 21st century,
perhaps we should ask what it means to live on the wrong side of
the virtual tracks of evaluative infrastructures.
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